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INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Workers' compensation legislation was first enacted in
Minnesota in 1913.1 The original legislation established an
elective compensation scheme whereby an employer could
choose to be covered by the new legislation 2 or could opt out of
the system and remain subject to somewhat modified common
law principles which had traditionally governed the relationship
between employer and employee.'
In 1921 the schedule of
compensation was expanded and new procedural requirements
were enacted, but the nature of the Act remained essentially
unchanged.4 In 1937 the elective provision of the Act was
abolished, and since that time coverage under the Workers'
Compensation Act has been compulsory for almost all Minnesota
employers.5
The Minnesota Legislature has made substantial revisions to
the Workers' Compensation Act since 1937, and the present Act
bears little resemblance to the original legislation. A major
revision of the Act was undertaken in 1953,6 but resulted in few
changes of real significance. In the mid-1970s, however, the
state's workers' compensation system became the subject of
increased scrutiny and criticism, and in 1977 the Minnesota
Legislature created a commission to study the system and make
recommendations for change.7 While some significant changes

1. Law of April 24, 1913, ch. 467, 1913 Minn. Laws 675 (current version at MINN.
STAT. §§ 176.001 to .861).
2. Id. §§ 8-36, at 677-94.
3. Id. §§ 1-7, at 675-77.
4. Law of March 15, 1921, ch. 82, 1921 Minn. Laws 90.
5. Law of March 12, 1937, ch. 64, 1937 Minn. Laws 109. Exclusions from
coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act are set out in Minnesota Statute
§ 176.041.

6. Law of April 24, 1953, ch. 755, 1953 Minn. Laws 1099.
7.

Law of May 27, 1977, ch. 342, sec. 27, 1977 Minn. Laws 697, 714; see also

MINNESOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION STUDY COMM'N, A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA

LEGISLATURE AND GOVERNOR I (1979).
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1995 WORKERS' COMPENSATION AMENDMENTS

were made to the Act in 1979 in response to the commission's
report,' there was widespread feeling that these changes were
not sufficient. In 1983, therefore, the legislature enacted the
first comprehensive overhaul of the Workers' Compensation Act
since its enactment in 1913.20
As far-reaching as any of the substantive changes resulting
from the 1983 amendment of the Act was the legislature's new
statement of the intent of the Act and the manner in which it
was to be interpreted. Prior to 1983, the Act was considered
remedial and was construed in favor of the injured employee."
The 1983 legislation expressly rejected this view, stating:
It is the specific intent of the legislature that workers'
compensation cases shall be decided on their merits and that
the common law rule of "liberal construction" based on the
supposed "remedial" basis of workers' compensation legislation shall not apply in such cases .... Accordingly, the
legislature hereby declares that the workers' compensation
laws are not remedial in any sense and are not to be given a
broad liberal construction in favor of the claimant or employee on the one hand, nor are the rights and interests of the

8. Law of June 7, 1979, ch. 3, 1979 Minn. Laws Exec. Sess. 1256 (providing for
vocational training that would secure a similar job or economic status and reducing
compensation during training from twice the employee's rate for compensation to
125% of the employee's rate for temporary total disability). See generallyJay Benanav,
Workers' Compensation Amendments of the 1979 Minnesota Legislature 6 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 743 (1980).
9. See, e.g., CITIZENS LEAGUE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMITTEE, WORKERS'
COMPENSATION REFORM: GET THE EMPLOYEES BACK ON THE JOB (1982) (stating that

Minnesota's system does not return workers to their jobs as quickly as other states',
secondary benefits are disproportionately large, and most workers' needs go
unfulfilled); MINNESOTA INSURANCE DIVISION, WORKERS' COMPENSATION IN MINNESOTA:
AN ANALYSIS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS (1982); C. WILLIAMS ET AL., UNIVERSITY OF
MINNESOTA INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CENTER, MINNESOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION
BENEFITS AND COSTS: AN OBJECTrIVE ANALYSIS (1983) (finding Minnesota to have some

of the highest workers' compensation costs in the nation).
10. Law of June 7, 1983, ch. 290, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310. For a comprehensive
analysis of the 1983 Amendments of the Workers' Compensation Act, including
historical and political background, see generally Leslie Altman et al., Minnesota's
Workers' Compensation Scheme: The Effects and Effectiveness of the 1983 Amendments, 13 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 843 (1987) (stating that the most radical change in the 1983
Amendments was the adoption of the "two-tier" system in which compensation for
permanent partial disability is paid at one level, or tier, or another).
11. See, e.g.,Jonas v. Lillyblad, 272 Minn. 299, 301, 137 N.W.2d 370, 372, 23 W.C.D.
659, 662 (1965) (stating that "the act is highly remedial and should not be construed
so as to exclude any employee from the benefits thereof unless it clearly appears that
he does not come within the protection of the act.").
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employer to 2be favored over those of the employee on the
other hand.'
This change in the purpose and construction of workers'
compensation laws in Minnesota, together with the increased
authority granted to the Department of Labor and Industry,"3
are perhaps the two most significant philosophical changes
flowing from the 1983 legislation. In addition, the 1983 Act
introduced new concepts governing receipt of benefits such as
the so-called
"two-tier" system and maximum medical improve14
ment.
In 1992, the Act was again amended." For injuries occurring on or after October 1, 1992, temporary partial disability
benefits were subject to a 225-week limit with no benefits payable
more than 450 weeks after the date of injury.16 The attorney
fee statute was also amended to increase the permissible
contingent fee from $6,500 to $13,000, but provided that the fee
is computed on a "per injury" basis.17 Finally, the legislature
provided that certain entities could establish managed care plans
to provide medical services to injured workers.18
Business and insurance interests continued to maintain that
Minnesota's workers' compensation rates were significantly

12.

Law ofJune 7, 1983, ch. 290, sec. 25, 1983 Minn. Laws, 1310, 1324 (effective

July 1, 1993, and codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.001 (Supp. 1983)).
13.

Prior to the 1983 Amendments, the Department of Labor and Industry had

only one set of rules relating to workers' compensation. Minnesota Rule 5220 (1983)
contained rules relating to rehabilitation services (MINN. R. 5220.0100 to.1700), general
workers' compensation practice and procedure (MINN. R. 5220.2500 to .4200), and the
Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (MINN. R. 5220.6500 to .7200). The 1983
Amendments gave the Department of Labor and Industry authority to promulgate rules
relating to several areas including: the Assigned Risk Plan; evaluation and rating of
permanent partial disability; fees for medical and rehabilitation services; rehabilitation
services; certification of health care providers; the Special Compensation Fund;
supplementary benefits; administrative conferences; allocation of dependency benefits;
change of physicians; intervention; general practice and procedure; claims processing;
standards for qualified rehabilitation consultants; and standards for workers' compensation claims adjusters. See 1983 Minn. Laws ch. 290, §§ 6, 86, 108, 165. The
Department did, however, have broad rulemaking authority with regard to procedure
prior to the 1983 Amendments. MINN. STAT. § 176.669, subd. 2 (1982).
14. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3e(b) (1984) ("two-tier" system); MINN. STAT.

§ 176.011, subd. 25 (1984) (maximum medical improvement).
15. Law of April 28, 1992, ch. 510, 1992 Minn. Laws 589 (codified at MINN. STAT.
ch. 176 (1992)).
16. Id. art. 1, sec. 4, at 593.
17. Id. art. 2, sec. 1, at 598.
18. Id. art. 4, sec. 13, at 635.
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higher than the rates in neighboring states, putting Minnesota
businesses at a competitive disadvantage.19 Labor and consumer groups maintained that Minnesota's workers' compensation
rates and benefits were below the national average, and advocated for regulation of the insurance industry.2"
On March 14, 1995, a group of Minnesota legislators from
both the House and Senate announced that they planned to
draft a bill designed to cut workers' compensation costs.
Representative Becky Kelso, DFL - Shakopee, predicted "broadbased support... will keep special interests from interfering
Proposed
with true reforms of workers' compensation."2 '
amendments to House File 642 were introduced and passed as
amended by the Minnesota House of Representatives on May 9,
1995.22 A slightly amended version of the bill passed the
Minnesota Senate on May 19, 1995, then returned to the House
for passage on May 22, 1995.23 The bill was signed by the
Governor on May 25, 1995.24
The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the
1995 Amendments to the Minnesota Workers' Compensation
Act. The authors do not attempt to address every change
effected by that legislation, and failure to address a particular
issue does not in any way mean that the authors view that issue
as insignificant. They have chosen to highlight those changes in
the law that they suspect will have the greatest impact on
workers' compensation practice in Minnesota, and will thus be
of particular interest to the practicing bar. It is not the purpose
of this article to suggest answers to the numerous questions
raised by the 1995 Amendments, and it should not be relied
upon for that purpose. Rather, the authors intend to "flag" key
issues and encourage practitioners to consider the impact the
1995 Amendments may have on their practice so that the
interests of their clients can be served successfully and efficiently.

19.

Scott Carlson, Caucus Unveils Plan to Revamp Workers' Comp Laws, ST. PAUL

PIONEER PRESS, March 15, 1995, at El.
20. DAVE OLMSCHEID, MINNESOTA CONSUMER ALLIANCE, DISPELLING THE MYrHS:
FACTS ABOUT MINNESOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION (undated).

21. Carlson, supra note 19, at E3.
22. H.F. 642, 79th Leg., MINN HOUSEJ. 3920, 4121 (May 9, 1995).
23. H.F. 642, 79th Leg., MINN. SENATEJ. 4114, 4208-09 (May 19, 1995) (house file
642 was heard as a special order and the text of amended house file 642 is identical to
S.F. No. 1020); H.F. 642, 79th Leg., MINN. HOUSEJ. 5331 (May 22, 1995).
24. Act of May 25, 1995, ch. 231, art. 1, 1995 Minn. Laws 1977.
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The questions presented by the amended Act will ultimately be
resolved as individual cases work their way through the workers'
compensation system, and readers are reminded that, in the time
between the completion of this article and its publication, some
of these questions may already have been litigated and possibly
decided by the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals
(WCCA) or the Minnesota Supreme Court.
It must also be noted that the effective date of the various
provisions of the 1995 Amendments may be the subject of
considerable discussion. As a general rule, an act is effective on
the first of August following its final enactment, unless a
different effective date is specified in the legislation.25 However, "any workers' compensation benefit change shall be effective on
the October 1 next following its final enactment."26 Thus,
absent a specified effective date, amendments to the statute that
affect benefits will be effective October 1, 1995, while other
changes will be effective August 1, 1995. It is not always clear,
however, whether an amendment constitutes a "benefit change,"
and disputes regarding such questions will likely have to be
resolved by the WCCA and the Minnesota Supreme Court.
Similarly, those courts may have to determine the impact of
certain provisions in the 1995 Amendments on employees
injured prior to the effective date of the provision in question.
Whether a statute may be applied retroactively generally depends
upon whether the statute is considered to be a procedural rather
than a substantive change in the law.27
II.

WAGE Loss BENEFITS

The 1995 legislation made a variety of significant changes
MINN. STAT. § 645.02 (1994).
26. MINN. STAT. § 176.1321 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
27. Statutory amendments generally will be applied to all injuries, including those
occurring before the effective date of the legislation, when the change is procedural
versus substantive in nature. See Kahn v. State, 327 N.W.2d 21, 27, 35 W.C.D. 425, 434
(Minn. 1982); see also Yaeger v. Delano Granite Works, 250 Minn. 303, 84 N.W.2d 363,
366, 20 W.C.D. 27 (1957) (stating that a statute may be constitutionally retroactive
where it relates to a remedial or procedural right, but when a right has arisen on a
contract and becomes vested, repeal of a statute does not affect that right or an action
for its enforcement). But seeJoyce v. Lewis Bolt & Nut Co., 412 N.W.2d 304, 308, 40
W.C.D. 209, 213-14 (Minn. 1987) (finding that where a worker is injured prior to
amendment, and sustains a new injury after amendment, "that new injury supersedes
the earlier injury as the controlling event, and the law in effect on the date of the new
injury supersedes the law in effect at the time of the earlier injury.").

25.
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affecting compensation for wage loss. First, permanent total
benefits are now available only to an employee who has significant ratable permanent partial disability. Moreover, an employee must meet specific threshold criteria before the traditional
factors used to determine entitlement to permanent total
disability benefits may be considered. Supplementary benefits
have also been eliminated. Second, limits have been established
for the duration of temporary total benefits, and the maximum
and minimum compensation rates have been changed. Perhaps
the most significant change is that the receipt of temporary total
benefits is now controlled by specific "cessation and recommencement" events.
A. Permanent Total Disability and Supplementary Benefits
1.

Permanent Total Disability Benefits

The five conditions constituting statutory permanent total
disability (PTD) were not changed by the 1995 legislation.28
However, the test for determining whether an employee falls into
a sixth PTD category has been substantially rewritten. Prior to
the 1995 Amendments, an employee could be found permanently and totally disabled if he or she suffered from an injury "which
totally and permanently incapacitates the employee from
working at an occupation which brings the employee an
income."29 The meaning of "totally and permanently incapacitated" was first defined in cases such as Schulte v. C.H. Peterson
Constr Co.,3' and later codified in a statute requiring an employee to establish that his or her physical condition, in combination with his or her age, training, experience, and the work
available in the community, caused the employee to be unable
to secure anything more than sporadic employment resulting in
an insubstantial income." This test has been retained in the
1995 legislation, but new threshold showings are now required

28. See MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 5(a) (1) (1994) (establishing an irrebuttable
statutory presumption of permanent total disability where an employee sustains: (1)

permanent and total loss of sight in both eyes; (2) loss of both arms at the shoulder;
(3) loss of both legs so that no prosthetic devices may be used; (4) complete and
permanent paralysis; or (5) total and permanent loss of mental faculties).
29.

MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 5(a)(2) (1994).

30. 278 Minn.79, 83, 153 N.W.2d 130, 133-34, 24 W.C.D. 290, 295 (1967).
31. See id.; 1992 Minn. Laws, ch. 510, art. 1, § 5 (effective October 1, 1992), which
codified the Schulte test at Minnesota Statute § 176.101, subdivision 5(b) (1992).
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before the Schulte test can be applied.
The new threshold requires that an employee less than fifty
years old at the time of injury must have at least a seventeen
percent permanent partial disability (PPD) rating of the whole
body before entitlement to PTD benefits will be considered. An
employee between fifty and fifty-five years old at the time of injury
must have at least a fifteen percent permanent partial rating.
Finally, an employee fifty-five years old or older at the time of
injury who has not completed high school or obtained a GED
must have at least a thirteen percent PPD rating. 2 The traditional Schulte test may now be considered only after the employee
meets the appropriate threshold criterion, but "[t] he employee's
age, level of physical disability, or education may not be considered to the extent the factor is inconsistent with the disability,
age and education factors specified" in the threshold criteria."
These threshold requirements raise several questions. First,
must the required percentage of PPD be derived from a single
work-related injury, or may the percentage of permanency
attributable to multiple work-related injuries be combined to
reach the required thirteen, fifteen, or seventeen percent? May
non-work-related permanency be combined with work-related
disability to reach the required threshold? Second, what are the
constitutional implications of the differential treatment that
apparently will be accorded similarly-situated employees under
the new threshold requirements? Pursuant to the amended law,
an employee with a fifteen percent PPD who was injured at age
fifty will meet the threshold requirements. However, a similarly
situated claimant with a fifteen percent permanent partial rating
will not meet those requirements if he was injured at age fortynine. One can also consider the case of the employee with an
eighth-grade education who is injured at age fifty-five, but who
has only a twelve percent permanency rating.
The purpose of graduated PPD ratings dependent on the
employee's age on the date of injury is unclear. If an employee
has a thirteen or fifteen percent rating and is totally disabled,
should he or she be barred from receiving permanent total
benefits if he or she was forty-five on the date of injury rather
than fifty or fifty-five? If the purpose of PTD compensation is to

32. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 5(2)(a-c) (Supp. 1995).
33. Id. at subd. 5(2).
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compensate an employee for the permanent loss of his or her
ability to work,3 4 it is unclear why the employee's age at the
time of injury should be a threshold requirement for receipt of
benefits.
One can speculate that the impetus to require
significant ratable permanent partial disability before an
employee can be deemed permanently totally disabled came, at
least in part, from cases upholding a finding of PTD where
employees had only minimal PPD ratings.3' However, these
decisions clearly were not based solely on the employee's age.
The application of the new threshold requirements appears to
be an area ripe for litigation and possible constitutional challenge. It might be reasonable to predict an increase in disputes
over the proper PPD rating accorded an employee, especially
when the potential ratings fall within the range covered by the
new thresholds."6 Attorneys may also feel compelled to get
expert opinions on ratings applicable to non-work-related conditions, and to litigate that issue, unless and until it is determined
that non-work ratings are irrelevant to the thresholds. Litigating
non-work-related PPD ratings, however, will obviously increase
the time and expense necessary to resolve claims. In the case of
younger workers unable to meet the age thresholds, the
amended Act may result in more claims for retaining benefits
under Minnesota Statutes section 176.102, subdivision 11.
Prior to the 1995 Amendments, permanent total compensation rates were calculated with reference to the maximum and
3 7
minimum rates of compensation for temporary total disability.
Effective October 1, 1995, for injuries occurring on or after that
date the maximum compensation for permanent total disability
is calculated in the same way, and is set at sixty-six-and-two-thirds

34. See, e.g., Schulte, 278 Minn. at 83, 153 N.W.2d at 133-34, 24 W.C.D. at 295.
35. See, e.g., Fields v. Paper & Graphics, 52 W.C.D. 545 (WCCA 1995) (finding a 60year-old employee with a sixth-grade education and limited work experience, but with
a capacity for sedentary work and a PPD rating of only 3% to be permanently and
totally disabled); Showman v. Bud Chapman's Restaurant, No. 566-60-8060 (WCCA Aug.
2, 1994) (deciding that an employee with a 3.5% PPD and pre-existing alcoholism was
permanently and totally disabled).
36. For example, whether an employee with an injury to the lumbar spine is rated
at 11% or 13% under Minnesota Rule 5223.0070, subd. 1, will now dictate not just the
amount of permanent partial compensation to which the employee is entitled under
Minnesota Statutes § 176.101, subdivision 2a, but, if the employee was at least 55 on the

date of injury, will determine whether the employee will be able to meet the statutory
threshold for permanent total compensation.
37.

SeeMINN. STAT.

§

176.101, subd. 4 (1994).
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percent of the employee's daily wage, subject to a maximum of
$615 per week."8 The minimum compensation rate, however,
is not tied to the minimum rate for a temporary total disability,
but is fixed at sixty-five percent of the statewide average weekly
wage (SAWW).o For injuries occurring on or after October 1,
1995, the permanent total compensation rate may be adjusted by
no more than two percent per year.'4 The first adjustment is
deferred until the fourth anniversary of the injury, and shall be
that of the last year only.4
2. Supplementary Benefits
Pursuant to legislation enacted in 1971, an employee
became entitled to supplementary benefits after a specified
number of weeks of total disability or receipt of temporary total
or permanent total benefits.42 Supplementary benefits were
intended, as the name implies, to supplement temporary total or
permanent total benefits to ensure a minimum level of weekly
compensation to a totally disabled employee, 43 and to ensure
that the wage loss benefits "of employees disabled for lengthy
periods fairly correspond to wages of other employees at the
time of payment of the benefit." 4 When supplementary
benefits are available, Minnesota Statutes section 176.132,
subdivision 2, "requires that the employee's base compensation

38. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subds. 1(b) (1), 4 (Supp. 1995); see 1995 Minn. Laws ch.
231, art. 1, sec. 37 (regarding effective date).
39. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 4 (Supp. 1995). While this section now fixes the
minimum compensation rate for PTD at 65% of the SAWW (approximately $328), the
compensation rate for temporary total disability is set at $104 or the employee's actual
wage, whichever is less. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 1(c) (Supp. 1995).
40.

MINN. STAT. § 176.645, subd. 1 (Supp. 1995).

41. Id. at subd. 2.
42. 1971 Minn. Laws ch. 383, sec. 1 (effective January 1, 1972). Supplementary
benefits were originally available to eligible employees whose temporary total or
permanent total benefit was less than $60.00 per week, but was later increased to the
difference between the amount the employee received under Minnesota Statute
§ 176.101 and 65% of the SAWW. This was the formula used prior to the 1995
Amendments. See MINN. STAT. § 176.132 (1994).
43. McBride v. Leon Joyce Blacktop, 422 N.W.2d 255, 259-60, 40 W.C.D. 1058,
1064-66 (Minn. 1988).
44. Cook v. Hiawatha Grain Co., 44 W.C.D. 152,157 n.4 (WCCA 1990) (stating that
"[t]
he statute eradicated situations where a severely injured employee's weekly benefit
rate remained unchanged for years, even decades, notwithstanding the fact that the
employee was unable to return to work... and notwithstanding the fact that the dollar
value of the benefit had been significantly eroded.").
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rate be adjusted pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 176.645
before being subtracted from sixty-five percent of the SAWW,"
when calculating the amount of supplementary benefits payable.45 The 1995 legislation repealed the section of the Act
which provided for supplementary benefits.'
Because the legislation did not provide a specific effective
date, it would appear that the effective date of the repeal was
October 1, 1995.' It is also unclear whether the repeal applies
only to supplementary benefits for injuries sustained on or after
the effective date of the repeal, or to all claims for supplementary
benefits brought on or after that date, regardless of the date of
injury. If the repeal of the supplementary benefits provisions
constitutes a substantive change in a worker's entitlement to
benefits rather than a mere procedural change, supplementary
benefits will still be available for injuries pre-dating the effective
date of the repeal.' This is the position currently taken by the
Special Compensation Fund.49 However, amendments repealing a prior provision of an act have been held to apply to an
employee with a pre-repeal date of injury if the employee's
entitlement to the benefit had not vested by the repeal date. °
Thus, if an employee was still within the prescribed 208-week
"waiting period" at the time of the repeal,5 ' the repeal may
apply to bar the employee's receipt of supplementary benefits.
The repeal of supplementary benefits is balanced by the new
increase in the minimum compensation rate for PTD which, at
sixty-five percent of the SAWW, correlates to the former

45. Kopish v. Sivertson Fisheries, 538 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1995).
46. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 1, sec. 35; 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, sec.
110 (repealing MINN. STAT. § 176.132).
47. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
48. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
49. Telephone interview with Brandon Miller, Director of the Special Compensation Fund (Apr. 8, 1996). The Department of Labor and Industry appears to agree with
this position. See MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY, A BRIEF OVERVIEW

OF MINNESOTA SESSION LAWS, CHAPTER 231 3 (undated) (changes in supplementary

benefits are "effective for injuries occurring on or after October 1, 1995").
50. See, e.g., Schreiner v. C.S. McCrossan, Inc., 465 N.W.2d 917, 919-20, 44 W.C.D.
50, 52-55 (Minn. 1991) (stating that the right to reimbursement is contingent until the
employee sustains a second injury despite the fact that an employer's right to
reimbursement vests at the time of registration); Marose v. Maislin Transp., 413 N.W.2d
507, 512-13, 40 W.C.D. 175, 182-83 (Minn. 1987) (holding that if a proceeding is
commenced within the time limitations of the repealed section, an employee may go
forward with his claim resulting from those injuries).
51.

See MINN. STAT. § 176.132, subd. 1 (1994).
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Moreover, while an employee
supplementary benefit rate.
formerly was not entitled to supplementary benefits until a
waiting period had elapsed, a permanently totally disabled
employee is now entitled to receive a minimum benefit equal to
sixty-five percent of the SAWW "during the permanent total
disability.",5 This minimum PTD rate is payable by the employer and insurer, whereas supplementary benefits were reimbursed
by the Special Compensation Fund. Thus, while the new
minimum PTD benefit protects the employee, it may encourage
employers and insurers to oppose PTD claims more vigorously
as the payments will not be reimbursed.
3.

Retirement Defense

The Minnesota Legislature first enacted a retirement
presumption as part of the 1983 overhaul of the Workers'
Compensation Act.5 4 The presumption could be rebutted quite
easily by the employee's own testimony or other lay testimony
regarding the employee's intent to retire. 5 In 1992, section
176.101, subdivision 8 was amended to provide that an employee's statement could be considered but would not suffice, in and
of itself, to rebut the retirement presumption. 6 The amendment also provided that "[t]emporary total disability payments
shall cease at retirement,"5 7 but made no reference to permanent total benefits.

In Behrens v. City of Fairmont,58 a decision

issued in July 1995, the supreme court stated that although
permanent total benefits may be subject to an offset for federal
52. See MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 4 (1994 & Supp. 1995). The offset allowed
against permanent total benefits in Minnesota Statute § 176.101, subd. 4, however, may
result in an effective permanent total rate below the 65% minimum.
53. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 4 (Supp. 1995).
54. 1983 Minn. Laws, ch. 290, secs. 42-68 (effective January 1, 1984) (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 8 (1994)). The law provided that for injuries occurring
after the effective date of the legislation, an employee who received social security
retirement benefits was presumed retired from the labor market. Id. This presumption
was rebuttable by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
55. See, e.g., Grunst v. Immanuel-St. Joseph Hosp., 424 N.W.2d 66, 69, 40 W.C.D.
1130, 1135 (Minn. 1988) (testimony of the employee that, but for her injury, she did
not intend to retire when she began receiving social security survivor's insurance
retirement benefits is "significant as rebuttal evidence," but other evidence, "if
available," is also to be considered).
56. Law of April 28, 1992, ch. 510, art. 1, sec. 7, 1992 Minn. Laws 589, 595
(effective October 1, 1992).
57. Id.
58. 533 N.W.2d 854, 53 W.C.D. 41 (Minn. 1995).
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disability benefits received, "permanent total benefits do not
cease altogether when the social security benefits are converted
to old age benefits or when the employee attains the age at
which he had hoped to retire had he not been injured."59
The 1995 Amendments left the retirement presumption
essentially unchanged as it applies to temporary total disability
payments. 60 The statute has been amended, however, to
specifically address permanent total disability payments, and now
provides that "[p] ermanent total disability shall cease at age 67
because the employee is presumed retired from the labor
market."61 As is the case with temporary total benefits, this is
a rebuttable presumption, but the employee must provide more
evidence than a mere statement that he did not intend to
62
retire.

Thus, for injuries occurring on or after October 1, 1995,
payment of PTD benefits will cease at age sixty-seven, unless the
employee can rebut the presumption of retirement. For injuries
occurring prior to that date, the result is unclear. If the date of
injury is deemed the controlling date, then Behrens appears to
prohibit assertion of the retirement defense to limit the duration
of PTD payments. However, if the date the employee attains age
sixty-seven is deemed the controlling date, then an employee
who reaches age sixty-seven before October 1, 1995, may
continue to receive permanent total benefits pursuant to Behrens,
while an employee who reaches sixty-seven on or after October
1, 1995, may be presumed to have retired and benefits will cease
unless the presumption is successfully rebutted by the employee.
B.

Temporary Total DisabilityBenefits

The 1995 Act contains significant changes to Minnesota
Statute section 176.101 governing receipt of temporary total
disability compensation (TTD).63
Initially, the maximum
compensation rate was increased to $615 per week commencing

59. Id. at 857, 53 W.C.D. at 44-45.
60. See MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 8 (Supp. 1995). An employee who receives
social security retirement benefits is presumed retired from the labor market. Id. "This
presumption is rebuttable by a preponderance of the evidence." Id.
61. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 4 (Supp. 1995).
62. Id.
63. See 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 1, § 17 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.101

(Supp. 1995)).
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on October 1, 1995.64 Minnesota Statute section 176.645,
which governs adjustment of benefits, was also amended to
provide that no adjustment may exceed two percent per year.
Adjustments for injuries after October 1, 1995, however, are
deferred until the fourth anniversary of the injury. The Workers'
Compensation Advisory Council may make recommendations to
the legislature to adjust both the maximum compensation rate
and the adjustment factor.' The minimum compensation rate
has been changed from twenty percent of the statewide average
weekly wage to $104 per
week or the employee's actual weekly
66
wage, whichever is less.
In cases governed by the 1995 Amendments, receipt of TTD
is now controlled by certain "cessation and recommencement
conditions" as set forth in paragraphs (e) and (e) (1) of section 176.101, subdivision 1. First of all, TTD shall cease entirely
67
after 104 weeks of benefits have been paid for that injury.
This is not a time limitation but is a durational limitation.
However, retraining compensation paid pursuant to Minnesota
Statutes section 176.102, subdivision 11 (b), does not reduce the
104 weeks of temporary total disability compensation otherwise
payable.'
All of the recommencement events set forth in the
statute are subject to this 104-week limit on the payment of
TTlD. 69
Next, temporary total disability compensation shall cease
when the employee returns to work. This is not a change from
prior law.7° Once TTD ceases due to a return to work, it may
be recommenced in two situations. First, TTD may recommence
if the employee is laid off or terminated for reasons other than
misconduct within one year after returning to work if the layoff
or termination occurs prior to ninety days after the employee has
reached maximum medical improvement. 71 Except for the
issue of misconduct, this provision does not appear to be a
significant departure from prior law. Under existing case law, a

64.
65.
66.
67.

MINN.
MINN.
MINN.
MINN.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

§ 176.101, subd. 1(b)(1) (Supp. 1995).
§§ 176.101, subd. l(b)(2), 176.645, subd. 1 (Supp. 1995).
§ 176.101, subd. 1(c) (Supp. 1995).
§ 176.101, subd. 1(k) (Supp. 1995).

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Compare MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3e(b) (Supp. 1983) with MINN. STAT.
§ 176.101, subd. 1(e) (Supp. 1995).
71. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 1(e)(1) (Supp. 1995).
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discharge for misconduct was not a bar to further receipt of TTD
benefits. Rather, the benefits of an employee discharged for
misconduct could be suspended until such time as the employee
again proved a causal connection between the personal injury
and the wage loss.72 How misconduct is defined for purposes
of the amended subdivision 1(e) (1) will undoubtedly be the
subject of litigation.73
The second recommencement event under subdivision 1 (e)
is if the employee becomes "medically unable to continue
working due to the injury."74 TTD may not be recommenced
under this clause, however, if the employee "is not actively
employed when the employee becomes medically unable to
work." The phrase "actively employed" is not defined.75
The next cessation event occurs if the employee "withdraws
from the labor market."76 Again, this provision does not appear
to be more than a codification of existing case law." If the
72. Marsolek v. George A. Hormel Co., 488 N.W.2d 922, 924, 41 W.C.D. 964, 967
(Minn. 1989).
73. The obligations of an employee to an employer may, in some cases, be set forth
in a collective bargaining agreement, in a contract of employment, in work rules, or in
an employee handbook. Violations by an employee of such contractual provisions may
give the employer the right to terminate an employee. Whether violations of such
provisions are specifically defined as misconduct will depend on the particular contract.
Whether a violation of such a provision will constitute misconduct under Minnesota
Statute § 176.101, subd. 1 (e) (1) is an open question. An employee may be disqualified
from unemployment compensation benefits if the "individual was discharged for
misconduct, not amounting to gross misconduct connected with work or for misconduct
which interferes with and adversely affects employment." MINN. STAT. § 268.09, subd.
1(b) (1996). There is a significant body of case law in this field dealing with the issue
of misconduct. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.09, nn. 33-71 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996). Under
workers' compensation law, benefits may be barred if the employee performs a
prohibited act resulting in injury, on the theory that the injury does not then arise out
of or in the scope of employment. See, e.g., Bartley v. C.H. Riding Stables, Inc., 296
Minn. 115, 119, 206 N.W.2d 660, 663, 26 W.C.D. 675, 679 (1973) (citing Walsh v. Chas.
Olson & Sons, 285 Minn. 260, 264, 172 N.W.2d 745, 748, 25 W.C.D. 42, 46 (1969)
(holding that since the employee was injured as a result of riding a horse, an act
forbidden by the employer, the injuries were outside the scope of employment).
74. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 1(e)(2) (Supp. 1995).
75. Query whether this language was a response to the case of Wills v. Kratz Farm,
519 N.W.2d 162, 49 W.C.D. 417 (Minn. 1993), in which the court held that an
employee who was on layoff status from his job and became medically disabled from
working was entitled to TrD benefits under Minnesota Statutes § 176.101, subdivision
3j (Supp. 1983).
76. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. I(f) (Supp. 1995).
77. See, e.g., Paine v. Beek's Pizza, 323 N.W.2d 812, 816, 35 W.C.D. 199, 206 (Minn.
1982) (stating that where the injured worker voluntarily removed himself from the
metropolitan labor market where there were greater employment opportunities, he
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employee reenters the labor market, TTD may be recommenced.
Presumably, this requires at a minimum a reasonable and
78
diligent job search.
Temporary total disability compensation also "shall cease if
the total disability ends and the employee fails to diligently
" 7
search for work within the employee's physical restrictions. 1
This provision appears to codify the longstanding Schulte"°
doctrine that an employee who is medically released to return to
work must conduct a reasonable and diligent job search for
employment as a prerequisite to an award of TTD. s1 Whether
the doctrine of Scott v. Southview Chevrolet Co. remains good law,
however, is unanswered. 2
Temporary total disability compensation is not payable if the
employee has been released to return to work without any
physical restrictions caused by the personal injury."3 This
provision only restates prior law that no wage loss benefits are
due unless the personal injury causes some decrease in an
employee's ability to work. 4
Section 176.101, subdivision 1 (i), does contain a significant
change from prior law. It first provides that TTD shall cease if
an employee refuses a job that is consistent with a plan of
rehabilitation filed with the Commissioner of the Department of
Labor and Industry (DOLI) which meets the requirements of
Minnesota Statute section 176.102, subdivision 4. This is not a

effectively and voluntarily withdrew from the labor market); LeMieux v. M.A.
Mortenson, 306 Minn. 50, 54, 234 N.W.2d 897, 900, 28 W.C.D. 91, 95-96 (1975)
(finding that an employee who became inappropriately self-employed rather than
seeking other employment was not entitled to a continuation of benefits because he had
withdrawn from the labor market).
78. See Redgate v. Sroga's Standard Serv., 421 N.W.2d 729, 733, 40 W.C.D. 933, 937
(Minn. 1988) (holding that an injured employee who has not yet reached full recovery
must make a diligent search for light-duty work).
79. MiNN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 1(g) (Supp. 1995).
80. Schulte v. C.H. Peterson Constr. Co., 278 Minn. 79, 153 N.W.2d 130, 24 W.C.D.
290 (1967).
81. Id. at 83, 153 N.W.2d at 134, 24 W.C.D. at 295 (stating that the concept of
temporary total disability depends primarily on an employee's ability to find and hold
a job, not on physical condition).
82. Scott v. Southview Chevrolet Co., 267 N.W.2d 185, 188-89, 30 W.C.D. 426, 432
(Minn. 1978).
83. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 1(h) (Supp. 1995).
84. Kautz v. Setterlin Co., 410 N.W.2d 843, 40 W.C.D. 206 (Minn. 1987).
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change from prior law. 5 However, if no rehabilitation plan has
been filed, TTD shall also cease if the employee refuses an offer
of "gainful employment" that the employee can do in the
employee's physical condition. The phrase "gainful employment" introduces a new concept into workers' compensation law.
If TTD benefits cease because the employee refuses such a job
offer, they may not be recommenced. a6
The 1983 Act defined two types ofjob offers: a light-duty, or
3f, job 7 and a suitable, or 3e, job.' The penalty for refusing
a 3f job was determined by case law to be a suspension of
benefits until such time as the employee again proved a causal
relationship between the personal injury and the wage loss. In
practice, the proof required to recommence TTD after refusal of
a 3f job offer was evidence of a reasonable and diligent job
search. 9 In contrast, refusal of a 3e job resulted in a forfeiture
of further TTD, ° TPD, and rehabilitation benefits.91 If, however, the 3e job offered under the 1983 Act was not the job the
employee had at the time of the injury, the employer was
statutorily required to offer and describe the job in writing.9"

An employee had fourteen days from the date of the written
offer, or fourteen days from the date of a final judicial determination that the job offer was one defined by subdivision 3e,
within which to accept or refuse the job.93 This 3f and 3e
distinction was eliminated by the 1995 Amendment to section 176.101, subdivision 1. Further, the 1995 Act no longer
requires a written job offer from the employer describing the
job.
A 3f or 3e job offer under the 1983 Act had to be one that
the employee could physically perform in his physical condi-

85.

Compare MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3e(b) (Supp. 1983) with MINN. STAT.

§ 176.101, subd. l(i) (Supp. 1995).
86. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. l(i) (Supp. 1995).
87. Id. at subd. 3f.
88. Id. at subd. 3e.
89. See, e.g., Brown v. Hoffman Eng'g. 41 W.C.D. 846, 850 (1988), summarily aff'd,
439 N,W.2d 27 (WCCA 1989).
90. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3(l) (Supp. 1983).
91. Id. at subd. 3(n). But see Boryca v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar, 487 N.W.2d 876,
878-79, 47 W.C.D. 136, 141-42 (Minn. 1992) (holding that entitlement to PTD is not

affected by employee's refusal of a 3e job).
92. MINN.STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3e(e) (Supp. 1983).
93. Manderfeld v.J.C. Penney, 526 N.W.2d 52, 54, 52 W.C.D. 152 (Minn. 1995).
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Section 176.101, subdivision l(i) retains this require-

ment since, for obvious reasons, an employee cannot be
expected to accept a job that the employee cannot physically
perform. More significantly, however, a 3e job had to be one
"that produces an economic status as close as possible to that
which the employee would have enjoyed without the disability."" Whether a particular job offer met this requirement was
the subject of repeated litigation. 6
The amended statute,
however, only requires that an employer offer "gainful employment."97 That phrase is not defined by the amended Act. Is a
minimum wage job gainful employment or must there be an
element of economic suitability as with a 3ejob? If an employee
takes what is considered "gainful employment" under this
provision, may an employer resist payment of temporary partial
benefits on the grounds that this "gainful employment" is not
representative of the employee's earning capacity? Are fringe
benefits to be considered in determining whether an offered job
constitutes gainful employment?
Another question arises as to whether factors typically
considered in rehabilitation matters are to be considered in
defining gainful employment."8 Rehabilitation is intended to
return an injured employee to a job "which produces an
economic status as close as possible to that the employee would
have enjoyed without disability."99 If the employee is receiving
vocational rehabilitation, in developing the rehabilitation plan
"consideration shall be given to the employee's qualifications,
including but not limited to age, education, previous work
history, interest, transferable skills, and present and future labor
market conditions.""°° Are these factors to be considered in
defining "gainful employment?" It is probable that this phrase
MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subds. 3e(b), 3f (Supp. 1983).
95. Id. at subd. 3e(b).
96. See, e.g., Keklah v. Gebert's Floor Coverings, 511 N.W.2d 437, 50 W.C.D. 80
(Minn. 1994) (litigating the distinction between a pre-injury construction job with postinjury electronic position).
97. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. l(i) (Supp. 1995).
98. InJerde v. Adolfson & Peterson, 484 N.W.2d 793, 46 W.C.D. 620 (Minn. 1992)
the court approached the question of whether the job was economically suitable under
subdivision 3e as primarily a rehabilitation issue. Thus all those factors typically relevant
in rehabilitation matters should be considered. See, e.g., MINN. R. 5220.0110, subp. 13
(1991).
94.

99.

100.

MINN. STAT. § 176.102, subd. 1(b) (1994).

Id. at subd. 4(g).
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will be the subject of repeated litigation since the consequence
for refusal of a job offer under this subparagraph may be
dramatic.'
Whether the Manderfeld case remains good law
may also be challenged.
Temporary total disability compensation ends ninety days
after the employee has reached maximum medical improvement
(MMI) unless the employee is in a retraining program pursuant
to Minnesota Statute section 176.102, subdivision 11 (b). This is
not a change from prior case law.'
Like the 104-week cap,
the attainment of MMI plus ninety days is also an absolute limit
on the receipt of TTD, subject only to the medically-unable-tocontinue-to-work provision.'
The definition of MMI, however, has been amended. The 1983 Act defined MMI as being "the
date after which no further significant recovery from or significant lasting improvement to a personal injury can reasonably be
anticipated, based upon reasonable medical probability.""0 4
The 1995 Amendment adds the phrase "irrespective and
regardless of subjective complaints of pain." 1 5 Under existing
case law, pain is a factor which the compensation judge may
0 6
consider in determining whether MMI has been reached.
The amended statute further provides that except in the case of
a medical inability to continue working under section 176.101,
subdivision 1 (e) (2), there may be only one MMI. The Amendment goes on to provide that an MMI determination cannot be
rendered ineffective if the employee's medical condition worsens
after an MMI determination.0 7 The intent of this Amendment
08
is unclear.

The 1995 Amendment also removes the requirement that an
MMI report be filed with DOLI to be effective. It further
101. Note, however, that refusal of gainful employment results only in a forfeiture
of TTD and not TPD and rehabilitation as with the refusal of a 3e job.
102. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3e(a) (Supp. 1983).
103. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. l(e)(2) (Supp. 1995).
104. MINN. STAT. § 176.011, subd. 25 (Supp. 1983).
105. MINN. STAT. § 176.011, subd. 25 (Supp. 1995).
106. See, e.g., Scheiterlein v. Lantz Lenses, 50 W.C.D. 447 (WCCA 1994) (finding no
MMI where doctor had made strong recommendations that the employee have a
chronic pain assessment with possible treatment).
107. MINN.STAT. § 176.011, subd. 25 (Supp. 1995).
108. The authors are unaware of any WCCA or supreme court case allowing more
than one MMI determination, except in the case of a medical inability to continue
working under Minnesota Statutes § 176.101, subdivision 3j (1993), or in the case of
multiple injuries.
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provides that MMI is reached when the employee receives a
written medical report stating that MMI has been reached
whether or not served by the employer and insurer09
C. Temporary PartialDisability Benefits

The 1992 Act established a limitation on receipt of temporary partial disability benefits as to 225 weeks or 450 weeks after
the date of injury, whichever occurs first.110 The 1995 Act
retains this limitation. However, the 1995 Amendment eliminates the prior entitlement to TPD if an employee becomes
unemployed from a 3e job due to seasonal conditions.11
III.

PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY

Chief among the revisions made in 1983 was the creation of
the "two-tier" system of benefits for permanent partial disability
(PPD).12

This system was adopted in an attempt to provide

adequate compensation for injured workers with permanent
disabilities, while encouraging employers to provide, and
employees to accept, suitable work.11 3 The system provided for
PPD payments to be made either: (1) as economic recovery
compensation (ERC);114 or (2) as impairment compensation
(IC)."5 Both ERC and IC were calculated based on the per-

centage of PPD sustained in relation to the body as a whole.
Whether an employee received ERC or IC depended
primarily on the employee's employment status ninety days after
service of MMI or ninety days after completion of an approved
retraining plan. 16 In keeping with the rehabilitative goals of
the 1983 Amendments, an employee who was offered or
returned to work at a suitable job was entitled to IC, while an
employee who did not was entitled to ERC. Depending on an
employee's wage rate, ERC benefits could be significantly more

109. MINN.
110.

STAT.

§ 176.101, subd. 1(j) (Supp. 1995).

MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 2(b) (Supp. 1993).

111. See 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 1, § 36, para. (b) (repealing MINN. STAT.
§ 176.101, subd. 3k).
112. 1983 Minn. Laws ch. 290, secs. 44-45 (Act approvedJune 7, 1983).
113. Altman et al., supra note 10, at 854-57, 866-67; see also Giese v. Green Giant Co.,
426 N.W.2d 879, 881, 41 W.C.D. 286, 290-91 (Minn. 1988) (Yetka, J., dissenting).
114. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3a (1984).
115. Id. at subd. 3b.
116.

See id. at subd. 3e.
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expensive for the employer and insurer. 117 At a minimum, the
statute required that ERC "be at least 120% of the impairment
employee would receive if that compensation
compensation the
18
were payable."

The 1995 Amendments eliminate the two-tier system. For
injuries occurring on or after October 1, 1995, an employee is
entitled to "permanent partial compensation" 9 based on the
proportion that the loss of function of the disabled part bears to
the whole body. This proportion is then multiplied by the dollar
This compensation is
amount specified in the statute. 120
payable "upon cessation of temporary total disability," and is
payable "in installments at the same intervals and in the same
amount as the employee's temporary total disability rate on the
date of injury."121 Lump sum PPD payments are no longer
permitted. 122
With the elimination of the two-tier system, if an employee
is entitled to permanent partial benefits, that benefit is payable
at a single rate, regardless of the employee's employment status
at any particular time. Thus, to the extent that the 1983 Act
provided an incentive for an employer to offer a job to a
disabled employee, the 1995 Amendments removed that
incentive.1 23 Moreover, the benefit is payable on the cessation
of temporary total payments, regardless of the circumstances
under which the cessation occurs. Thus, the amount and
method of payment of permanent partial benefits are no longer
directly linked to or dependent upon the attainment of MMI,
the acceptance of a "suitable job," or the completion of a

117. Id. at subds. 3e, 3p.
118. Id. at subd. 3t(a).
119. MINN. STAT. § 176.021, subd. 3 (Supp. 1995).
120. The statutory schedule to be used when calculating the amount of permanent
partial compensation due is identical to the pre-amendment schedule for calculating
impairment compensation. CompareMINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 2a (Supp. 1995) with
MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3b (1984).
121. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 2a(b) (Supp. 1995); see also MINN. STAT.
§ 176.021, subd. 3a (Supp. 1995). Some references to ERC and IC appear to have been
inadvertently retained in the amended § 176.021, subd. 3a.
122. See MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3g (1984) (providing for payment of
impairment compensation in a lump sum if an employee successfully returned to a
suitable job pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3e).
123. But see discussion infra Part VII.B. regarding the 1995 legislation's creation of
a civil action for damages for an employer's refusal to offer continued employment to
a disabled employee.
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retraining plan. There does, however, remain an indirect
connection insofar as these
events relate to the cessation of
12
temporary total payments.

1

IV. APPORTIONMENT, CONTRIBUTION AND REIMBURSEMENT
In a dispute between multiple employers and insurers, the
1995 Amendments prohibit equitable apportionment of liability
for injury except in two instances: (1) "apportionment among
employers and insurers is allowed in a settlement agreement
filed pursuant to section 176.521; " 12' and (2) "an employer or

insurer may request equitable apportionment of liability for
workers' compensation benefits among employer and insurers by
arbitration pursuant to subdivision 5. " 126 The phrase "equitable apportionment of liability" is defined by the statute to
"include all attempts to obtain contribution and/or reimbursement from other employers or insurers" and, but for the
exceptions noted, "contribution and reimbursement actions
based on equitable apportionment are not allowed under this
chapter."127

The new subdivision applies "without regard to

whether one or more of the injuries results from a cumulative
trauma or a specific injury."12 ' However, the subdivision does
12 or to apportionment
disease
not apply to occupational 13
0
against a preexisting disability.

Absent a voluntary settlement between employers and
insurers pursuant to section 176.521, disputes among employers
and insurers regarding apportionment of liability may only be
settled by binding arbitration under section 176.191, subdivision
5. If a party has paid more than $10,000 in medical benefits or
124. See discussion supra Part II.B.
125. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 77 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.191, subd.
la (Supp. 1995)). Minnesota Statutes § 176.521 governs stipulations for settlement.
126. MINN. STAT. § 176.191, subd. la (Supp. 1995).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Liability for an occupational disease is governed by MINN. STAT. § 176.66, subd.
10, which provides that the employer liable for compensation for an occupational
disease is "the employer in whose employment the employee was last exposed in a
significant way to the hazard of the occupational disease." MINN. STAT. § 176.66, subd.
10 (1994). This section was not changed by the 1995 legislation.
130. Minnesota Statute § 176.191, subdivision la, provides that apportionment of
liability for a "preexisting disability is allowed only for permanent partial disability as
provided in section 176.101, subdivision 4a." MINN. STAT. § 176.191, subd. la (Supp.
1995). The latter section was not changed by the 1995 legislation.
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fifty-two weeks of indemnity benefits, and makes the request
within one year thereafter, that party may require that the
dispute be submitted to arbitration.13 1 The arbitrator's decision is conclusive on the issue of apportionment between
employers and insurers.'3 2 The amended section 176.191,
subdivisions la and 5, "are effective for apportionment proceedings instituted after July 1, 1995, "1ss and rules governing this
process have already been promulgated and adopted effective
March 18, 1996.1'
The statute's failure to clearly define "equitable apportionment of liability" may be problematic.
The definition in
subdivision la states only that it "includes" all contribution and
reimbursement actions between employers and insurers. While
the statute clearly intends to limit employer/insurer actions for
contribution and/or reimbursement, the use of the word
"includes" implies that apportionment proceedings are not
limited to such actions. It is thus unclear how the legislation
may affect claims brought by an employee directly against
multiple employers and/or insurers. While it is arguable that
employee actions are unaffected, since section 176.191 specifically addresses liability disputes between employers and insurers
only, there is no "bright line" separating employee actions from
issues of apportionment between employers and/or insurers.
There are instances where an employer's or insurer's claim for
reimbursement or contribution affects an employee's rights.
For example, Employer A, who is or has been paying
benefits to an employee, alleges that the employee sustained a
second injury while working for Employer B and files a claim for
contribution. The employee would typically have an interest in
the outcome of this litigation, because in some cases the
employee's wage while working for Employer B may be a real
consideration. Does the statute prohibit a compensation judge
from determining this claim? What is the result of an arbitrator's finding that the employee did (or did not) sustain an injury
with Employer B? Similarly, in the case of two or more admitted
injuries, there may not have been a determination of the

131.
subd. 5
132.
133.
134.

1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, sec. 78 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.191,
(Supp. 1995)).
Id.
1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, sec. 112.
See infra note 230.
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employee's wage on the dates of injury. In order to apportion
liability for wage loss benefits, however, there may need to be a
determination regarding the employee's wage. Does the statute
prohibit a compensation judge from making such a determination? Must a compensation judge advise the last employer or
insurer to submit any contribution or reimbursement dispute to
arbitration even when the compensation judge is prepared to
hear and decide all other issues in the case? It is arguable that
such a process does not provide for an efficient use of judicial
resources.
Moreover, the amended statute requires that apportionment
disputes between employers and insurers must now be either
settled via a stipulation for settlement pursuant to section
176.521 or submitted to binding arbitration. However, the
statute's apparent "removal" of employer/insurer apportionment
disputes from thejurisdiction of the compensationjudge appears
to be inconsistent with other sections of the Workers' Compensation Act. For example, amended section 176.191, subdivision la,
appears to be inconsistent with the immediately-preceding
subdivision 1. Subdivision 1 provides that, when a temporary
order is issued pending resolution of a multi-employer/insurer
dispute regarding liability for payment, the party ultimately
determined to be liable "shall be ordered to reimburse any other
party for payments which the latter has made."" 5 A reimbursement order necessarily presupposes a determination of the
percentage of liability attributable to the respective employers
and insurers. Subdivision la also appears to conflict with section
176.081, subdivision 1(b), which indicates that in a claim for
multiple injuries, a compensation judge must determine the
amount of attorney fees attributable to each injury.1.6 Such a
determination may involve an apportionment of liability between
multiple employers and/or insurers.
The new statutory thresholds in section 176.191, subdivision
5, may also be problematic. An employer or insurer apparently
has no right to require arbitration to settle an apportionment
dispute if it does not satisfy the statutory thresholds in subdivi-

135.
136.

MINN. STAT. § 176.191, subd. 1 (Supp. 1995).
MINN. STAT. § 176.081, subd. 1(b) (Supp. 1995). This section provides that if

multiple injuries are the subject of a dispute, the commissioner, compensation judge
or WCCA may determine the attorney fees attributable to each injury. Id.
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sion 5 and make the request within one year of paying either
$10,000 in medical benefits or fifty-two weeks of indemnity
benefits. Assuming a case involving multiple injuries and a
request for medical benefits only, the employer and insurer at
the time of the last injury may pay benefits and meet the
statutory thresholds relatively quickly. If the insurer then seeks
arbitration to resolve apportionment issues, the arbitrator's
decision is conclusive and binding on the employers and
insurers."3 7 If the employee later brings a claim petition
against all employers and insurers, is the compensation judge
bound by the arbitrator's prior apportionment of liability? If
not, what is the result if the compensation judge arrives at a
different conclusion than the arbitrator? Given the possibility
that inconsistent results may be reached in these two different
forums, insurers may well be reluctant to voluntarily pay benefits
under a temporary order or otherwise. This reluctance could
have an impact on the payment of benefits to the employee and
may lead to an increase in petitions by employees for temporary
orders under section 176.191, subdivision 1.1"8 Assuming
equitable apportionment is still available in cases where an
employee has a direct claim against two or more employers
and/or insurers, the employee also may gain settlement leverage
by refusing to join all potentially liable parties.
Problems may also arise in cases involving apportionment of
PPD. Pursuant to section 176.101, subdivision 4a, compensation
payable for PPD which is attributable in part to a preexisting
disability is reduced by the proportion of the disability "which is
attributable only to the preexisting disability."" 9 This provision was not changed by the 1995 legislation. The WCCA has
long held that only "statutory apportionment" under section
176.101, subdivision 4a is available for PPD; equitable apportionment is not available.14° However, the supreme court has

137. MINN. STAT. § 176.191, subd. 5 (Supp. 1995).
138. Section 176.191, subdivision 1 provides that, where benefits are payable and a
dispute exists as to which employers and/or insurers are liable for payment, one of the
employers or insurers, or the Special Compensation Fund, may be ordered to make
payments pending a determination of which has liability. Payments made pursuant to
the order may be reimbursed as appropriate after the liability determination has been
made. MINN. STAT. § 176.191, subd. 1 (Supp. 1995).
139. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 4a (1994).
140. See, e.g., Everett v. Iten Chevrolet, No. 476-32-8054, 6 (WCCA May 9, 1995)
(stating that equitable apportionment is not available for permanent partial disability);
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recently held that when "benefits are appropriately awarded on
the basis of a single permanency rating of the disability resulting
from more than one compensable injury, the situation seems to
us better served by application of the principles of equitable
apportionment.""' The effect, if any, of the 1995 legislation
on the Stone decision is unclear. As noted above, the statute's
express subject-liability disputes between employers and
insurers-may mean that the abolition of equitable apportionment in this section does not affect an employee's claim against
multiple employers and/or insurers.
Finally, what is the import of the July 1, 1995, effective date
for all apportionment proceedings, regardless of the date of
injury? If the right to contribution or reimbursement vests at
the time of an employee's second injury,' the amendments
to section 176.191 may not affect that right. 43
V. ATTORNEY FEES
A.

Contingent Attorney Fees

Contingent attorney fees in workers' compensation cases are
governed by Minnesota Statutes section 176.081, subdivision 1.
In 1992, this statute was amended to increase the permissible
contingent fee from $6,500 to $13,000.1'
As amended in
1992, a contingent fee of twenty-five percent of the first $4,000
of compensation awarded to the employee and twenty percent
of the next $60,000 of compensation awarded to the employee
was permissible. The 1995 Amendment retains the 25/20
formula and the $13,000 contingency fee.
Prior to the 1992 Amendments to section 176.081, contingent fees were typically computed on a "per case" basis. Where
Krech v. Koch Ref. Co., 45 W.C.D. 378, 382 (WCCA 1991), summarily affd, (Minn. Nov.
5, 1991) (stating that in cases involving injuries sustained on or afterJanuary 1, 1984,
equitable apportionment of PPD is not appropriate).
141. Stone v. Lakeland Constructors, 533 N.W.2d 36, 40, 52 W.C.D. 637, 641 (Minn.
1995).
142. See Haverland v. Twin City Milk Producers Ass'n, 273 Minn. 481, 489-90, 142
N.W.2d 274, 280-81, 23 W.C.D. 764, 776-77 (1966).
143. See supra note 27 and accompanying text; MINN. STAT. § 176.191 (Supp. 1995).
144. 1992 Minn. Laws, ch. 510, art. 2, sec. 1. The $6,500 limit on contingent fees
had been in effect since 1975. MINN. STAT. § 176.081, subd. 1 (Supp. 1975). The
formula was then 25% of the first $4,000 and 20% of the next $20,000 of compensation
awarded to the employee. Rd For purposes of brevity, this will be referred to as the
25/20 formula.
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successive claims were brought by an employee for benefits due
to a single injury, the 25/20 formula was normally used to
compute the contingency fee in each successive case. In 1992,
section 176.081, subdivision 1 (b), was amended to limit all fees
for legal services to $13,000 "per injury." The 1992 Amendment,
however, permitted an employee's attorney to petition for what
are commonly called "excess fees" under section 176.081,
subdivision 2.145 The 1995 Amendments eliminated the words
"except as provided by subdivision 2" from subdivision 1 (b) of
the statute,"46 and repealed the excess fee statute. 47 The
legislature also amended subdivision 1 to provide that $13,000 is
the "maximum permissible fee" for all legal services related to
the same injury." The 1995 Amendments further require that
retainer agreements contain language notifying the employee
that the cumulative maximum fee is $13,000 for "fees related to
the same injury" and that an employee "is under no legal or
moral obligation to pay any fee for legal services in excess of the
foregoing maximum fee."14
These Amendments raise numerous issues. It is not
uncommon in workers' compensation matters that a single injury
may give rise to multiple claims brought serially. For example, an
employee represented by counsel may assert a claim for temporary total disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits,
and medical expenses resulting from a work injury. If the
employee prevails or the case is settled, the attorney normally
would be entitled to a contingency fee under the 25/20 formula
up to the maximum of $13,000. If sometime after the resolution
of those claims the employee undergoes major surgery due to
the original work injury and again becomes totally disabled, the
employee may have another claim for benefits. Pursuant to the

145. Minnesota Statute § 176.081, subd. 1(b) (1992), provided, in part: "All fees for
legal services related to the same injury are cumulative and may not exceed $13,000,

except as provided by subdivision 2." Id. Subdivision 2 provides that an application for
excess attorney's fees may be made. Id. at subd. 2.
146. 1995 Minn. Laws, ch. 231, art. 2, sec. 45 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.081,

subd. 1 (Supp. 1995)).
147.

Id. § 110 (repealing MINN. STAT. § 176.081, subd. 2).

148. Id. § 45.
149. Id. § 48 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.081, subd. 9 (Supp. 1995)). An attorney
hired by an employee is required to prepare, have signed by the employee, and file a
retainer agreement. Id No fee may be awarded without a signed retainer agreement.
Id.
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1995 Amendments, if the $13,000 maximum fee was totally or
nearly all paid in the first case, will the employee be able to
obtain representation for a second claim? Does the attorney
who represented the employee in the first proceeding have any
continuing obligation to the employee? Before agreeing to
represent an employee for an injury to which the 1995 statute
applies, should the attorney first determine whether fees have
been paid to another attorney for claims arising out of the same
injury? Before receiving any fee for a case in which the 1995
Amendments apply, must the attorney make such an inquiry?15° It is not the purpose of this article to suggest answers to
these issues. Ultimately, that may be the task of the Minnesota
Supreme Court.
B. Roraff and Heaton Fees

In 1980, the supreme court decided the case of Roraff v.
State."' The version of Minnesota Statute section 176.081 then
in effect provided only for contingent fees based on the 25/20
formula payable from benefits recovered for the employee. The
claim in the Roraff case was solely one for medical expenses
under Minnesota Statute section 176.135. Thus, there were no
benefits flowing directly to the employee that could be subject to
a contingency fee. In its decision, the supreme court quoted the
statute: "In case of his inability or refusal seasonably to [furnish
medical treatment and supplies to an injured employee] the
employer shall be liable for the reasonable expense incurred by
or on behalf of the employee in providing the same," and
52
interpreted "reasonable expense" to include attorney fees.1
This principle was later expanded to include claims for rehabilitation assistance under Minnesota Statute section 176.102 where
there were no claims for benefits flowing directly to the employee from which the attorney could claim a contingency fee. 53
In 1992, these cases were codified in section 176.081,

150. See MINN. STAT. § 176.081, subd. 10 (1994). This section makes it a gross
misdemeanor for an attorney to knowingly violate any of the provisions of section
176.081 with respect to authorized fees for legal services. Id.
151. 288 N.W.2d 15, 32 W.C.D. 297 (Minn. 1980).
152. Roraff, 288 N.W.2d at 16, 32 W.C.D. at 298.
153. See Heaton v. J.E. Fryer & Co., 36 W.C.D. 316 (Minn. 1983). The supreme
court ruled on the issue in Weisser v. Country Club Mkt., 397 N.W.2d 891, 39 W.C.D.
282 (Minn. 1987).
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subdivision 1 (a), to provide for an hourly fee for representing
the employee for recovery of medical expenses or rehabilitation
benefits. 15 4 Many workers' compensation cases involve both
claims for benefits and claims for medical expenses and/or
rehabilitation benefits. In Kopish v. Sivertson Fisheries, the WCCA

held that an attorney may be entitled to Roraff or Heaton fees if
the contingency fee alone is inadequate to reasonably compensate the attorney for representing the employee on the medical
or rehabilitation issues.'5 5 This princi le was codified in the
1995 Amendments to section 176.081.25
A determination of the amount of an award of Roraff or
Heaton fees was previously based on the factors set forth in
section 176.081, subdivision 5. Effective August 1, 1995,
subdivision 5 was repealed. 5 7 In cases governed by the 1995
Amendments, the method of calculation of Roraff and Heaton
fees has been changed. All fees, including fees for obtaining
medical and rehabilitation benefits, must be calculated by
applying the 25/20 formula to the dollar value of the medical or
rehabilitation benefit awarded, where ascertainable. 58 If the
dollar value is not reasonably ascertainable, the maximum fee for
which the employer and insurer are liable is the lesser of the
hourly fee charged or $500.19 These provisions apply both to
cases where the sole issue is medical or rehabilitation benefits
and cases previously governed by Kopish. The amended statute
further requires the employee's attorney to concurrently file "all
outstanding disputed issues."" Failure to do so may result in
a denial of attorney's fees relating to an issue which could

154. MINN. STAT. § 176.081, subdivision I(a), provided, in part: "All fees must be
calculated according to the [25/20] formula under this subdivision or earned in hourly
fees for representation ... on rehabilitation or medical issues under section 176.102,
176.135, or 176.136." MINN.STAT. § 176.081, subd. 1(a) (1992). Prior to 1992, however,
attorney fees, payable on an hourly basis, were available in medical disputes. See MINN.
STAT. § 176.135, subd. 1 (1988).
155. 538 N.W.2d 139, 39 W.C.D. 627 (Minn. 1995).
156. "Attorney fees for recovery of medical or rehabilitation benefits or services shall
be assessed against the employer or insurer only if the attorney establishes that the
contingent fee is inadequate to reasonably compensate the attorney for representing the
employee in the medical or rehabilitation dispute." MINN. STAT. § 176.081, subd.
1(a)(1) (Supp. 1995).
157. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 110.
158. MINN. STAT. § 176.081, subd. l(a)(1) (Supp. 1995).
159. Id. atsubd. 1(a)(2).
160. Id. at subd. 1(a) (3).
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reasonably have been addressed in a prior proceeding relating
to the same injury.'61
The amended statute retains the principle that attorney's
fees shall be awarded only on genuinely disputed claims or
portions of claims. 6 2 New language was added, however,
defining what constitutes a "dispute." There can be no dispute
until the employer and insurer have "adequate time and
information to take a position on liability.""6 This statute does
" 164
not define what constitutes "adequate time or information.
Further, in cases where no other litigation is pending at DOLI
or the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) in which the
employee is represented, an attorney may not receive a fee on a
medical or rehabilitation issue until the employee consults with
DOLI and DOLI certifies that there is a dispute and that it has
tried to resolve the dispute." DOLI plans to have procedures
in effect by June 661, 1996, to effectuate the legislative intent of
these provisions.
These changes to the Roraff and Heaton fees also raise
numerous questions. It is probably not unreasonable to assume
that where the sole issue in dispute is a small medical bill, the
employee will have some difficulty obtaining legal representation.
In such cases, how will the interests of medical providers, health
insurers, or agencies such as Human Services and Medicare be
protected? Where the workers' compensation insurer denies
liability for a medical bill, whether based on a primary denial or
issues of reasonableness and necessity, the health carrier is
obligated to make payment.167 Governmental agencies typically

161. Id. Presumably, this provision is designed to prevent an attorney from
"splitting" a claim so as to first receive a contingent fee and then Roraff or Heaton fees
in a second case.
162. Id. at subd. 1(c).
163. Id.
164. See MINN. STAT. § 176.021, subd. 3 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the
procedure and timing of compensation); MINN. STAT. § 176.221, subd. 1 (1994)
(explaining the timing and procedure of the payment of treatment charges); MINN. R.
5220.2540, subp. 1 (1995) (discussing the payment and timing of permanent partial
disability); MINN. R 5220.2550, subp. 1 (1995) (discussing timing of payments for
permanent partial disability); MINN. R. 5220.2620, subp. 3 (1995) (discussing the timing
of medical claims).
165. MINN. STAT. § 176.081, subd. 1(c) (Supp. 1995).
166. Telephone interview with Tadd Jude, Department of Labor & Industry (Mar.
1996).
167. MINN. STAT. § 176.191, subd. 3 (1994).
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make payment of medical bills as submitted. Since the claim of
a third-party payor is one of subrogation only, the payor has no
right to institute a direct claim against the workers' compensaPrior to the 1995 Amendments, attorneys
tion insurer.1"
would often accept cases where the sole issue was the medical
bill because of the possibility of obtaining a Roraff fee. If an
employee is unable to obtain representation, it remains to be
seen how the interests of the interested parties will be accommodated.
C. Other Fees

Effective August 1, 1995, Minnesota Statutes section 176.081,
subdivision 8, was repealed. 69 The law previously provided for
payment of fees to the employee's attorney by an employer and
insurer when benefits were payable to the employee, a dispute
existed between two or more employers or insurers as to liability,
and litigation ensued to resolve the dispute. As amended, an
employee's attorney remains eligible for a fee only where a
dispute exists between employers and insurers as to which is
liable for payment and a temporary order is issued. 170 An
attorney fee in such case must be reasonable. Previously, a
determination of what constituted a reasonable fee was made
using the factors of Minnesota Statute section 176.081, subdivision 5. Since that section has now been repealed, there now
exists no statutory framework within which to determine what
constitutes a reasonable fee. Presumably, it will be left to the
WCCA and the Minnesota Supreme Court to develop guidelines.
The amended Act also retains the $13,000 "per case"
limitation on defense attorney fees or wages.17 1 It is unclear
whether the term "per case" applicable to defense fees and the
term "per injury" applicable to employee's attorney's fees both
carry the same meaning. If these terms are different, there may
be constitutional implications. However, this difference in the
terms applicable to employee's and defense attorney fees

168. MINN. STAT. § 176.361, subd. 1 (1994); Freeman v. Armour Food Co., 380
N.W.2d 816, 820, 38 W.C.D. 445 (Minn. 1986).
169. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 110.
170. See MINN. STAT. § 176.191, subd. 1 (Supp. 1995).
171. CompareMINN. STAT. § 176.081, subd. 1(e) (1994) with MINN. STAT. § 176.081,
subd. l(e) (Supp. 1995).
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D. Effective Date
Changes to the statutory provisions regarding attorney fees
have, in the past, been deemed procedural changes and thus
have been applied to all attorney fee determinations made after
the effective date of the legislation, regardless of the date of
injury. 17' Generally, however, the cases dealt with an increase
in attorney fees. Would the result be the same if an injured
employee requires legal services today due to an injury, but has
previously paid $13,000 in fees for services arising out of the
same injury? Again, it remains to be seen how an interested
party will be accommodated.
VI.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

A.

Rates and Interest
The maximum and minimum compensation rates have been
changed from the former 105% maximum and twenty percent
minimum of the SAWW, 174 to a maximum of $615 and a
minimum of $104 or the employee's actual wage, whichever is
less. 175 Future adjustments to these rates are not yet established, but will be made by the legislature at the recommenda17 6
tion of the Workers' Compensation Advisory Council.
Adjustments for injuries occurring on or after October 1, 1995,
are limited to two percent per year and are deferred until the
1 77
fourth anniversary of the injury.
Interest on workers' compensation payments, including
payments for wage loss, medical treatment and rehabilitation

172. See MINN. STAT. § 176.081, subds. 1(b), I(c) (1992) (stating the availability of
legal fees).
173. Engman v. Metalcote Grease & Oil, 48 W.C.D. 327 (WCCA 1993) (applying the
1992 legislative changes in attorney fee provisions); see also Guerrero v. Wagner, 246
N.W.2d 838, 840-41, 29 W.C.D. 190,194-95 (Minn. 1976) (stating that the law governing
attorney fees is the law in effect at the time of the determination of the fees); Larson
v. National Car Rental Co., 35 W.C.D. 37, 39 (WCCA 1982) (holding that the increase
in maximum attorney fees is a procedural rather than a substantive change).
174. See MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 1 (1994).
175. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 1 (Supp. 1995). But see MINN. STAT. § 176.101,
subd. 4 (Supp. 1995) (setting the minimum rate for PTD at 65% of the SAWW).
176. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. l(b)(2) (Supp. 1995).
177.

MINN. STAT. § 176.645, subds. 1, 2 (Supp. 1995).
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expenses, had been set at eight percent per year, or the amount
set under Minnesota Statute section 549.09, whichever was
greater. 178 Now the rate will float with the rate set for district
court judgments in section 549.09, subdivision 1,179 and may
sometimes make interest calculations more difficult. However,
the statute retains the provision that interest on payments
ordered to be paid but not paid when due and not appealed will
be set at twelve percent.180
B. Sanctions and Penalties
The 1995 Amendments added a new section to the Workers'
Compensation Act, providing for the imposition of sanctions if
a party or a party's attorney fails to appear at a scheduled
conference or hearing, is "substantially unprepared to participate" or "fails to participate in good faith."8 ' In such case the
party and/or the party's attorney may be ordered to pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, of the other party.
The DOLI and the OAH are authorized to establish additional
sanctions by rulemaking.182 The statute provides little guidance concerning the criteria to be used when determining
whether a party or attorney has violated this section. Moreover,
it is questionable that this provision will be used to tax costs
against an employee or employee's attorney."3

178. MINN. STAT. § 176.221, subd. 7 (1994). But see MINN. STAT. § 176.191, subd.
3 (1994) (setting the interest rate at 12% in cases involving certain payments made by
medical insurers).
179. MINN. STAT. § 176.221, subd. 7 (Supp. 1995).
180. MINN. STAT. § 176.221, subd. 5 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
181. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 49 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.081, subd.
12 (Supp. 1995)).
182. MINN. STAT. § 176.081, subd. 12 (Supp. 1995).
183. Id. Taxation of costs against an employee can deter injured employees from
pursuing their claims and is therefore generally not appropriate. Schenkler v. Dick
Hume & Assoc., 49 W.C.D. 96,106 (WCCA 1993). However, under certain circumstanc-

es a calendarjudge may strike a case from the trial calendar or ultimately dismiss a case
for failure to prosecute. MINN. STAT. § 176.305, subd. 4 (1994). See also DeMars v.
Robinson King Floors, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 501, 504, 30 W.C.D. 109, 114 (Minn. 1977)

(stating that ajudge "has the discretion to dismiss a suit where the plaintiff's failure to
exercise reasonable diligence is unexcused, and the nature of the claim requires the
exercise of such diligence").
Similarly, the WCCA has jurisdiction to impose

appropriate sanctions when a party fails to comply with a provision of the Act. Rath v.
Perlman Rocque Co., 384 N.W.2d 464, 466, 38 W.C.D. 535, 537-38 (Minn. 1986).

Clearly, inherent in the authority of the commissioner, compensation judges, and the
WCCA to issue orders is the authority to enforce them.
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Several changes have also been made to many of the penalty
provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, including the
following:
(1) The penalty for an employer's failure to make a
prescribed payment for the benefit of the Special Compensation
Fund remains at fifteen percent of the amount due, but the
minimum penalty has been increased from $500 to $1,000.
Imposition of this penalty is discretionary.184
(2) Minnesota Statutes section 176.185, subdivision 5,
prohibits an employer from requiring an employee to pay any
part of the costs of the employer's workers' compensation
insurance coverage. The penalty for an employer's wilful
withholding in violation of this prohibition has been increased
from 200% to 400% of the amount withheld. Sixty percent of
the penalty is payable to the employee, the remaining forty
percent is payable to the assigned risk safety account. Imposition
of this penalty is mandatory." 5
(3) If an employer fails to begin payment of compensation
(including medical and rehabilitation payments and compensation for PPD) within the time prescribed by section 176.221,
penalties may be assessed ranging from thirty percent of the
compensation due (not to exceed $500) to 105% of the
compensation due (not to exceed $5,000), depending upon the
number of days that payment is delayed. This constitutes an
increase from the amounts formerly in effect." 6 In the alternative, a penalty of up to $2,000 for each instance of failure to
pay benefits or file a notice of denial of liability within the time
prescribed by the statute may be imposed.8 7 These two alternative penalty provisions are both discretionary.
(4) The 1995 Amendments made four changes to section
176.225, which provides for an additional award of compensation
where an employer or insurer fails to pay or delays payment of

184. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 59 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.129, subd.
10 (Supp. 1995)).
185.

1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 75 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.185, subd.

5a (Supp. 1995)).
186.

Compa=e MINN. STAT. § 176.221, subd. 3 (1994) with § 176.221, subd. 3 (Supp.

1995).
187.

1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 84 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.221, subd.

3a (Supp. 1995)).
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compensation188
First, such penalties are now mandatory
rather than discretionary. 8 9 Second, the amount of additional
compensation awarded may be up to thirty percent of the
compensation due, an increase from the former limit of twentyfive percent."9
Third, a new ground for imposition of a
penalty has been added: frivolous denial of a claim.' 9 1 Finally,
if an employer is guilty of inexcusable delay in making payments,
the payments found to be delayed shall be increased by twentyfive percent, as opposed to the former ten percent. 9 '
(5) The penalty for an employer, insurer or healthcare
provider who fails to file any report required by the workers'
compensation law, has been increased from $200 to $500 for
each failure. These penalties are discretionary. 9
(6) Penalties for prohibited conduct by an insurer, selfinsurer, adjuster, or third-party administrator have been increased as much as $1,000 per violation, depending on the
specific conduct and the number of occurrences.194 These
penalties remain discretionary and may be imposed in addition
to any other penalties that might apply for the same conduct.
Further, a self-insured entity which knowingly violates a provision
of section 186.181, subdivision 2, governing self-insureds, is now
subject to a $10,000 "civil penalty," an increase from the former
$5,000, for each offense."
(7) Minnesota Statute sections 176.238 and 176.239,
governing discontinuance of compensation, provide for a fine
payable to the Special Compensation Fund if an employer

188. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, §§ 87-88 (codified at MiNN. STAT. §§ 176.225,
subds. 1, 2 (Supp. 1995)). The WCCA has recently determined that medical expenses
can constitute "compensation" under this section, and late payment of medical expenses
exposes an employer or insurer to penalties under § 176.225, subd. 1. Husted v.
Northern Castings, No. 471-82-6203 (WCCA Aug. 18, 1995).
189. MINN. STAT. § 176.225, subd. 1 (Supp. 1995).
190. Id.
191. Id. at subd. 1(c). "Frivolously" is defined as "without a good faith investigation
of the facts or on a basis that is clearly contrary to fact or law." MiNN. STAT. § 176.225,
subd. 1 (Supp. 1995).
192.

MINN. STAT. § 176.225, subd. 5 (Supp. 1995).

193. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 89 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.231, subd.
10 (Supp. 1995)).
194. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 80 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.194, subd.
4 (Supp. 1995)).
195. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 69 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.181, subd.
7 (Supp. 1995)).
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violates the requirements of either section. The 1995 legislation
increased the maximum fine from $500 to $1,000 per viola96
tion.1
C. Appeal and Review
A party may still file a request for a formal hearing within
thirty days of a decision in a settlement or administrative
conference at DOLI. 19 7 However, two significant changes have
been made affecting a party's right to review of such decisions.
First, decisions regarding a claim for medical benefits of $1500
or less are reviewable only by the commissioner, whose decision
is apparently final and unappealable. 98 Second, review hearings on issues involving liability for past treatment or services
that have no affect on an employee's entitlement to ongoing or
future medical or rehabilitation benefits need not be held within
the sixty-day limit established by the statute for other matters.' 99 The statute establishes no time limit within which these
cases must be heard. A party's right to an expedited hearing on
a discontinuance has also been retained, but the time within
which a hearing must be held has been extended from thirty to
200
sixty days.
Finally, the statute governing DOLI small claims court
actions has been amended to provide that there is no appeal and
no request for a formal hearing allowed from a settlement
judge's decision in those cases. The statute also now specifically
provides that such decisions "shall be res judicata in subsequent
proceedings. "201
D. Other Amendments
Pursuant to amended section 176.291,02 an employee's

196. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 91 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.238, subd.
10 (Supp. 1995)).
197. MINN. STAT. § 176.106, subd. 7 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
198.

MINN. STAT. §176.106, subd. 7 (Supp. 1995).

199. Id.
200. See MINN. STAT. § 176.238, subd. 6 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
201. MINN. STAT. § 176.2615, subd. 7 (Supp. 1995); see also MINN. STAT. § 176.305,
subd. la (Supp. 1995) (stating that "[iun proceedings under § 176.2615, the summary
decision is final and not subject to appeal or de novo proceedings."); cf. MINN. STAT.
§ 176.2615, subd. 7 (1994), (allowing a request for a formal hearing and stating that
such decisions "are not resjudicata").
202. See 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 97.
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claim petition need no longer be notarized, but must only be
signed by the petitioner. Further, if an employee has lost fewer
than three days from work, any document filed under the
Workers' Compensation Act must have a copy of the First Report
of Injury attached. 03
An employer or insurer now has sixty days from the date of
injury to file a denial of liability after payment of compensation
has begun, rather than the thirty days formerly provided.20 4 A
notice of denial also must now state in detail "the facts forming
the basis for the denial" as well as the specific reasons explaining
the denial.0 5
The Act now also provides that when an electronic filing of
a document marks the beginning of a prescribed time limit for
another party to assert a right, the time limit will be extended by
two days if it can be shown that the other party was served by
mail.20 6 Where an electronic filing is made, the statute also
provides for the use of digitized signatures, provided that the
signature is certified by DOLI within five business days of the
filing.20

7

A new provision allowing telephone, audio or visual

"teleconferencing" of mediation sessions, conferences and
20 8
hearings has been added to the Act.

Finally, the amended statute contains a new requirement
that any request for retraining must be filed "before 104 weeks
of any combination of temporary total or temporary partial
compensation have been paid." 20 9 After that time, retraining

"shall not be available" unless the request was made within the
prescribed time period. 21 0

The employer or insurer must

notify the employee of this time limit in writing before eighty
weeks of temporary benefits have been paid, regardless of the
number of weeks that have elapsed since the date of injury.

203. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 94 (amending MINN. STAT. § 176.275, subd.
1).
204. Compare MINN. STAT. § 176.221, subd. 1 (1994) with MINN. STAT. § 176.221,
subd. 1 (Supp. 1995).
205. MINN. STAT. § 176.221, subd. 1 (Supp. 1995).
206. MINN. STAT. § 176.285 (Supp. 1995).
207. Id.
208. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 56 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.107 (Supp.
1995)).
209. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 51 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.102, subd.
11(c) (Supp. 1995)).
210. Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1996

37

William Mitchell
LawM/TCHELL
Review, Vol. LAW
22, Iss.REVEW
4 [1996], Art. 9
WLLJAM

1530

[VOL. 22

Failure to comply with this requirement may result in a penalty
of $25 per day that the notice is late, up to a maximum of
$2,000. In addition, the time to file the retraining request is
extended by the number of days that the notice is late. In no
case may a request be filed more than 225 weeks after any
combination of temporary benefits has been paid.211 This is a

significant departure from prior law regarding retraining.
It seems logical to expect that retraining requests may now
be routinely filed in almost all cases, lest the right to seek
retraining be lost. It is unclear, however, whether any sort of
justification for retraining should accompany the request, or
whether a simple request is sufficient. If the need for retraining
is not foreseeable within the statutory period, it would appear
that many employees-including those who may ultimately prove
to be the best candidates for retraining-may not anticipate that
need and make the statutory request.
VII.
A.

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Collective BargainingAgreements

The 1995 legislature enacted new legislation allowing for the
recognition of certain provisions in a collective bargaining
agreement between employers and employees in the construction trades. 12 In order for such agreements to be recognized
by the agencies and courts in the workers' compensation system,
an employer must give notice to its workers' compensation insurance carrier.2 1 ' A collective bargaining agreement will not be
recognized if this notice is not given. Further, a collective
bargaining agreement that "diminishes an employee's entitleunder the Workers' Compensation Act is "null
ment to benefits"
214
and void."
To be recognized as valid, a collective bargaining agreement
may establish obligations and procedures relating to workers'
compensation only in the following areas: (1) alternative dispute
resolution; (2) use of an agreed list of medical providers; (3) use
of a limited list of impartial physicians to conduct independent

211.

MINN. STAT. § 176.102, subd. 11(d) (Supp. 1995).

212. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 71 (codified at MiNN. STAT. § 176.1812
(Supp. 1995)).
213.

MINN. STAT. § 176.1812, subd. 5 (Supp. 1995).

214. Id. at subd. 4.
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medical examinations; (4) creation of a light-duty, modified job,
or return to work program; (5) use of a limited list of rehabilitation and retraining providers; (6) establishment of safety
committees and safety procedures; or (7) adoption of a twentyfour-hour health care coverage program if a twenty-four-hour
plan pilot project is authorized by law. 15
The Department of Labor and Industry has been authorized
to adopt rules to implement this section."' The commissioner
will also establish a pilot program involving up to ten private and
ten public employers, which shall end on December 31,
2001. 217
B. Civil Action
An employee has long been able to file a civil action for
damages for retaliatory discharge if he or she was discharged,
threatened with discharge or intentionally obstructed from
seeking workers' compensation benefits. 218 The 1995 Amendments to the statute retain that cause of action and add a new
civil cause of action against an employer who, "without reasonable cause, refuses to offer continued employment to its
employee when employment is available within the employee's
physical limitations."2 9 The new cause of action is not available against employers with fifteen or fewer full-time equivalent
employees. This section may serve, at least to some degree, to
provide some incentive for an employer to offer a job to a
disabled employee, and thereby balance the removal of the
incentive provided by the two-tier system of payment for
PPD.220
Section 176.82 provides for damages equal to one year's
wages, up to a maximum of $15,000. The damages payable
pursuant to subdivision 2 are to be paid in addition to any other
payments to which an employee is entitled under the worker's
compensation laws, and may not be covered by an insurance
contract. While this provision in and of itself seems clear, these

215.

Id. atsubd. 1(b)-(g).

216. Id. at subd. 7; see infra note 229.
217. Id. at subd. 6.
218. See 1975 Minn. Laws ch. 359, § 21 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.82 (1994)).
219. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 1, § 30 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.82, subd.
2 (Supp. 1995)).
220. See discussion supra part III.
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damages are only payable "from the date of the refusal to offer
continued employment... to continue during the period of the
refusal." 221 Establishing a specific beginning and end for an

employer's refusal to offer a job to a disabled employee,
especially when combined with the requirement that the refusal
be "without reasonable cause," may prove difficult. The statute
does, however, list three criteria to be used when determining
whether employment was available: (1) the employer's continuance in business; (2) the employer's written rules on seniority;
provisions of any collective bargaining
and (3) 22the
2
agreement.
Several questions concerning the application of this
subdivision will doubtless arise, for example: When does an
employer's exposure to suit under this subdivision end? Must a
compensation judge consider this issue when appropriate, and
will findings in a workers' compensation proceeding have any
impact on a subsequent civil action? Does the employee have
any obligation to mitigate damages, and is he or she entitled to
an award for attorney fees and costs? These questions will be
resolved only with time.
C. The Role of the Department of Labor & Industry

The 1995 legislature granted DOLI the authority to
promulgate several new sets of administrative rules. Areas for
rulemaking include: (1) a merit rating plan for small businesses
in the Assigned Risk Plan; 2 . (2) "commercial self-insurance
groups" established to govern groups of employers self-insured
for workers' compensation liability;2 24 (3) sanctions for a party

or party's attorney for failure to appear, prepare for or participate in good faith in a conference or hearing;2 25 (4) formation
of "light-duty work pools" to promote a disabled employee's
22 7
return to work; 2 6 (5) certification of managed care plans;
221. MINN. STAT. § 176.82, subd. 2 (Supp. 1995).
222. Id.
223. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 6 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 79.251, subd.
2 (Supp. 1995)).
224. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, §§ 28-41 (codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 79A.19-.32

(Supp. 1995)).
225. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 49 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.081, subd.
12 (Supp. 1995)).
226. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 57 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.108 (Supp.
1995)).
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(6) the value of medical services provided by hospitals with "100
or fewer licensed beds";2 . (7) recognition of collective bargaining agreements establishing obligations and procedures relating
to workers' compensation;. 9 (8) arbitration of apportionment
disputes between multiple employers and/or insurers;. ° (9)
electronic filing of documents and the use of digitized signatures;2"' and (10) establishment and administration of joint
labor-management safety committees by employers of more than
twenty-five employees.23 2
Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 175.16, subdivision
1, the Commissioner of the DOLI is now "the administrator and
supervisor of all of the department's dispute resolution functions
and... may delegate authority to settlement judges and others
to make determinations. "233 This authority extends to administrative conferences under section 176.106, administrative
conferences concerning discontinuances under sections 176.238
and 176.239, and the approval of settlements pursuant to section
176.521.
It is unclear whether this authority to delegate
decisionmaking power to "others" may lead to the establishment
of a new level of hearings in addition to the settlement and
administrative conferences presided over by a settlement judge.
Moreover, there is no information in the statute regarding the
experience and qualifications that these possible new decisionmakers must possess.
Finally, Minnesota Statutes section 176.261 authorizes DOLI
to act for and advise parties to a workers' compensation proceed-

227.

1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 63 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.1351, subd.

5(b) (Supp. 1995)).
228. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art 2, § 65 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.136, subd.
lb(a)-(b) (Supp. 1995)).
229. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 71 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.1812
(Supp. 1995)). Rules regarding collective bargaining by employers engaged in
construction-related activities were proposed in July 29, 1996. MINN. REG. 139.
230. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, §§ 77-78 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.191,
subds. la and 5 (Supp. 1995)). Rules governing apportionment arbitration were
proposed on November 27, 1995. 20 Minn. Reg. 1236. Notice of their adoption as
modified was given on March 11, 1996. 20 Minn. Reg. 2286; MINN. R. 5229.0100 to
.0700 (effective Mar. 18, 1996).
231. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 96 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.285 (Supp.
1995)).
232. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 101 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 182.676
(Supp. 1995)).
233. 1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 43 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 175.16 (Supp.
1995)).
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ing, to represent a party in workers' compensation proceedings,
and to make efforts to resolve disputes.2 4 The 1995 legislation
expanded this authority, stating that the department's "obligation to make efforts to settle problems exists whether or not a
formal claim has been filed with the department. "235 The
intended scope of this authority is also unclear.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Sponsors of the 1995 Amendments to the Minnesota
Workers' Compensation Act stated that "Minnesota has lost
control of a system that should be simple but is not. We are
foolishly allowing this state not to be as competitive as we could
be."23 6 The goal of the legislation was "to keep and expand
our state's number of good jobs. The status quo should not be
acceptable." 23 7

Opponents of the 1995 Amendments argued

that the state's workers' compensation system did not need to be
overhauled, that the 1992 Amendments had helped reduce
insurance costs and that costs would continue to decrease
without further amendment of the Act. 2" Labor leaders were
concerned, however, that the 1995 Amendments would cut
benefits to injured workers, and predicted that
provisions of the
2 39
amended law will not reduce insurance costs.

Whether the 1995 legislation will achieve the stated goals is
impossible to predict. In any event, that is a discussion better
suited to the political arena. As stated at the outset, the purpose
of this article is to provide an overview of the 1995 Amendments
and highlight changes that the authors anticipate may have an
impact on workers' compensation practice, and not to resolve
the issues.

234.

235.
1995)).
236.
237.
238.
239.

MINN. STAT. § 176.261 (1994).

1995 Minn. Laws ch. 231, art. 2, § 92 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.261 (Supp.
Carlson,
Carlson,
Carlson,
Carlson,

supra note 19, at El (quoting Rep. Becky Kelso).
supra note 19, at El (quoting Sen. Linda Runbeck, IR - Circle Pines).
supra note 19, at E3.
supra note 19, at E3.
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